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I. Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. 
Espinosa1 (“Espinosa”) may give debtors and creditors in a chapter 13 
proceeding greater latitude in discharging student loan debt through out-
of-court agreements. In Espinosa, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, 
affirmed a Ninth Circuit case2 upholding a confirmed chapter 13 plan 
that purported to discharge a debtor’s student loan interest if the plan 
were successfully consummated, even though no adversary proceeding 
had been commenced and no undue hardship determination had been 
made by the bankruptcy court.3 Known as a “discharge by declaration” 
provision, these clauses within a chapter 13 plan provide for the 
discharge of a specific outstanding debt, in this case student loan 
interest, once debtors have successfully finished their plan. With the 
Espinosa decision, these provisions may grow more commonplace as 
debtors with student loans face insolvency and search for means to 
resolve their debt without incurring the time, effort, and expense of 
pursuing an adversarial proceeding. 
Prior to Espinosa, federal circuit courts were split on how to 
handle discharge by declaration provisions, some of which can contain 
language inconsistent with Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(8), which 
mandates a finding of undue hardship before a student loan may be 
discharged in whole or in part.4 Some circuits found them objectionable 
per se while others allowed those discharge provisions to stand if the 
creditor did not object during confirmation proceedings or appeal the 
confirmation order. The Tenth Circuit found that a creditor lacked any 
                                                        
* University of Tennessee, College of Law, Candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2016. I 
would like to thank Professors Joan M. Heminway, Thomas Plank, and George Kuney 
for their inimitable, and boundless, assistance through the developmental, writing, and 
editing process. 
1 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010). 
2 Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that student loan debts can be discharged in a Chapter 13 plan if the creditor does not 
reject it after receiving notice of the proposed plan). 
3 Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 276-78. 
4 11. U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (2010). 
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right to challenge such a provision after confirmation if it had not 
objected to the provision in the confirmation process or later appealed 
the order, heavily emphasizing the importance of finality to an order 
confirming a plan.5 Similarly, in the Ninth Circuit, the court upheld a 
confirmed plan because of the creditor’s failure to object or to later 
appeal the order. 6  However, the Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits 
decided differently, holding that a discharge by declaration provision in a 
chapter 13 plan violated a creditor’s due process for lack of adequate 
notice when the debtor did not serve the creditor with a summons and 
complaint in an adversary proceeding, but instead merely provided 
notice of the plan’s confirmation proceedings and the opportunity to 
object to confirmation.7 
With the Espinosa decision, the Supreme Court clarified how a 
discharge by declaration provision should be treated by circuit courts. 
The Court stressed that the parties to a chapter 13 agreement can, 
outside of the confines of a courtroom, decide and agree among 
themselves which of the debtor’s loans would constitute an undue 
hardship.8 These arrangements directly benefit debtors: they are shorn of 
at least a part of their debts. Similarly, creditors may value these out-of-
court agreements for the economy of avoiding both financially costly 
and time-consuming litigation, in addition to the uncertainty of a judicial 
proceeding. The creditor who approves such an agreement is analogous 
to the prosecutor who approves a plea bargain, or a litigant who 
approves of an out-of-court settlement. These alternatives to litigation 
are less expensive, offer a degree of certainty and insulate the parties 
from risk of an in-court loss. 
II. Student Loan Landscape 
There will be no shortage of student debtors in the future. In 
recent years, national student loan debt has passed $1 trillion dollars, 
held by 38 million students borrowing for college-related expenses. 9 
With tuition and fees rising 3.7 percent at private nonprofit colleges and 
                                                        
5 See generally Andersen v. UNIPAC-NEBHELP (In re Andersen), 179 F.3d 1253 (10th 
Cir. 1999).  
6 See generally Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Pardee (In re Pardee), 193 F.3d 1083 
(9th Cir. 1999).  
7 See e.g., Ruehle v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Ruehle), 412 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 
2005); In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005); Banks v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. 
(In re Banks), 299 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2002).  
8 Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 278.  
9 Rohit Chopra, Student Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU (July 17, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/student-
debt-swells-federal-loans-now-top-a-trillion/.  
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2.9 percent for in-state residents at four-year public schools in 2014,10 
student debt will likely continue to increase in coming years and 
continue to remain an economic problem. As students take out more 
debt, discharge by declaration provisions may grow more widespread as 
a viable option for student loan debtors hoping to restore their financial 
situation. 
Student loan debt impairs a borrower’s ability to participate as a 
consumer—borrowers are less likely to purchase homes and less likely to 
hold other classes of debt. 11  There is some promise, though, as the 
national student loan default rate has decreased to 13.7 in 2014, from 
14.7 the year before.12 Furthermore, a range of repayment options are 
available to student loan debtors, ranging from a monthly payment fixed 
according to the debtor’s adjusted gross income 13  to the more 
conventional standard repayment option. 14  Unfortunately, those are 
neither salve nor panacea. The greater a graduate’s debt burden, the 
greater it will “impair the ability of recent college graduates to qualify for 
a loan”15 and impact risk taking in small business formation.16 
 
 
                                                        
10  Janet Lorin, College Tuition in the U.S. Again Rises Faster than Inflation, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Nov. 13, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-13/college-tuition-in-the-u-s-
again-rises-faster-than-inflation. 
11 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOAN AFFORDABILITY: ANALYSIS OF 
PUBLIC INPUT ON IMPACT AND SOLUTIONS 7 (2013) (“Between 2007 and 2010, the 
average student loan balance for households with student debt climbed by nearly 15 
percent, even as households have deleveraged and other classes of consumer debt have 
declined.”) [hereinafter STUDENT LOAN REPORT]. 
12 Nick Anderson, National student loan default rate dips to 13.7 percent; still “too high,” official 
says, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/national-student-loan-default-rate-
declines-to-137-percent/2014/09/24/d280c8bc-43ee-11e4-b437-
1a7368204804_story.html. 
13  Repayment Plans, FED. STUDENT AID (2013), 
http://www.direct.ed.gov/RepayCalc/dlindex2.html (last updated Oct. 28, 2015) 
(stating that under the income contingent repayment, borrowers are capped at 20% of 
their discretionary monthly income). 
14 Id. 
15 STUDENT LOAN REPORT, supra note 11, at 8. 
16 Id. (“[S]tudent debt may suppress risk-taking and innovation by discouraging the 
formation of new businesses by young entrepreneurs”). 
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III. Implicated Rules, Statutes, and Holdings 
Realistically, for most filers, the possibility of discharging student 
loans pursuant to a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is remote.17 For student 
loans to be discharged, a debtor must show that the debt is an undue 
hardship. 18  The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“FRBP”) 
require an adversary proceeding to establish the dischargeability of a 
student loan debt.19 For most would-be chapter 13 filers trying to rid 
themselves of their student debts, the debtor must initiate litigation 
against their creditor, serving a complaint and summons, engaging in 
discovery, motion practice, and, if there are disputes of material fact, trial 
and the potential for appeals. 
In a chapter 13 proceeding, the court must hold a confirmation 
hearing for the chapter 13 plan, during which any party in interest may 
object.20 If there are no objections to the plan, the court will confirm the 
plan provided three criteria are met. Most noteworthy for the Espinosa 
decision that “the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and 
with the other applicable provisions of this title”21 and “the plan has 
been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”22 
The FRBP governing an adversary proceeding are largely 
identical to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) that govern 
civil litigation in the district courts. FRBP 700323 is the analog of FRCP 
3, which requires that a plaintiff commence a civil action with a 
complaint.24 Meanwhile, FRBP 700825 is the analog of FRCP 8, which 
governs the form and content a pleading must take. 26  Despite these 
similarities, there are some differences, particularly regarding service of a 
                                                        
17 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (2005) (precluding student loan debt from discharge after 
completion of a Chapter 13 payment plan). 
18 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2005) (Allowing student loans to be discharged provided that 
“unless excepting such debt from discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship on 
the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.”). 
19 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6) (2010). 
20 11 U.S.C. § 1324 (2005) (“[T]he court shall hold a hearing on confirmation of the 
plan. A party in interest may object to confirmation of the plan.”).  
21 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) (2005). This relates to one of the first issues in the Espinosa 
decision, in which the proposed chapter 13 plan was itself inconsistent with the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
22 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2005).  
23 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7003 (2014) (“Rule 3 . . . applies in adversary proceedings.”). 
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (2007). 
25 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008 (2014) (“Rule 8 . . . applies in adversary proceedings.”). 
26 FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (2010). 
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summons. Under FRCP 4, a nonparty who is at least 18 years old must 
serve a summons with a copy of the complaint,27 unless the defendant 
chooses to waive service of process.28 Under FRBP 7004, the same is 
true29 except that a plaintiff may initiate service by prepaid first class 
mail.30 Instead of being an alternative to physical service, the FRBP allow 
a plaintiff to establish service of process with prepaid certified mail in 
addition to physical service of process.31 
Service of process is an integral part of due process. 32 
Insufficient service implicates fundamental constitutional rights. 33  In 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,34 the Supreme Court held 
that “notice [must be] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections.”35 Notice itself must 
rise above “a mere gesture” to meet due process,36 and it “must be of 
such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, . . . and it 
must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their 
appearance.”37 Notice for notice’s sake is insufficient, and it must take 
into account the defendant’s circumstances to properly meet due 
process. 
Failure to satisfy due process in a court proceeding can lead to a 
court’s judgment being voided.38 Under FRCP 60 or FRBP 9024,39 a 
                                                        
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c) (2015). 
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (2015).  
29 FED. R. BANKR. P 7004(a) (2014) (“Personal service under Rule 4(e)–(j) F.R.Civ.P. 
may be made by any person at least 18 years of age who is not a party, and the 
summons may be delivered by the clerk to any such person.”). 
30  FED. R. BANKR. P 7004(b) (2014) (“[I]n addition to the methods of service 
authorized by Rule 4(e)–(j) F.R.Civ.P., service may be made within the United States by 
first class mail postage prepaid . . . .”). 
31 See id. 
32 See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (stating that due process required 
either personal appearance or personal service of process before a defendant could be 
bound by a rendered judgment).  
33 See also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5) (2009) (allowing a party to submit a motion to 
dismiss for insufficient service of process).  
34 339 U.S. 306 (1950).  
35 Id. at 314. 
36 Id. at 315. 
37 Id. at 314 (citations omitted).  
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 60 (2007). 
39 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024 (2014). 
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party on motion can challenge a judgment as void. A court can declare a 
judgment void if the court rendering judgment lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction40 or if a constitutional right is infringed upon, such as a due 
process violation because of inadequate or lack of service of process.41 
On the other hand, an erroneous judgment is not a valid basis for a void 
judgment.42 
IV. Espinosa 
In Espinosa, Justice Thomas delivered a unanimous decision 
affirming a lower court decision that discharged student loan interest 
without commencing an adversarial proceeding and without an undue 
hardship determination by the bankruptcy court. 43  In the late 1980s, 
Francisco Espinosa took out federal student loans with a total principal 
of $13,250.44 Later, he submitted a chapter 13 plan proposing to repay 
only the principal on his debts, but not the accrued interest, and 
providing that the plan’s completed expiration would discharge the 
interest. 45  The court clerk then mailed a copy of Espinosa’s plan to 
United Student Aid Funds Inc. (“United”), Espinosa’s creditor, which 
did not object to the plan or its proposed discharge of Espinosa’s 
student loan interest, even though there was no adversarial proceeding 
initiated or determination of undue hardship. 46  Afterward, the 
bankruptcy court confirmed the plan.47 
Espinosa completed the plan’s payments in 1997, and the 
bankruptcy court discharged his student loan interest.48 Three years later, 
United sought to collect the interest on Espinosa’s loans. 49  After 
Espinosa filed a motion seeking to enforce the 1997 discharge, United 
filed a cross-motion under Federal Rule 60(b)(4) to void the bankruptcy 
                                                        
40  11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2862 (3d ed. 2015) (“[A judgment] is void only if the court that rendered 
it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter . . . .”). 
41 Id. (“[I]f [the court] acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.”).  
42 Id. See also Ingvoldstad v. Kings Wharf Island Enters., 593 F. Supp. 997, 1004 (V.I. 
1984). (“[A] judgment is not void and is therefore not within the ambit of Rule 60(b)(4) 
simply because it is erroneous.”) (citation omitted). 
43 See Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1205.  
44 Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 264. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 265.  
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 265-66.  
49 Id. at 266. 
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court’s confirmation of Espinosa’s plan on two claims: (1) the provision 
in Espinosa’s plan discharging his student loan interest was inconsistent 
with the FRBP, and (2) United’s due process rights were violated 
because Espinosa failed to serve it with a summons and complaint.50 
The Court stated that for a judgment to be rendered void under 
Rule 60(b)(4), the judgment must have been “premised either on a 
certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that 
deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.”51 However, 
failing to serve United with a summons and a complaint amounted to 
inadequacy only of a procedural right guaranteed by the FRBP, not a 
constitutional one.52 Due process need only be tailored to the Mullane 
standard. 53  In this case, due process was met when United received 
actual notice from the bankruptcy court concerning the filing and 
contents of Espinosa’s plan.54 As for the court’s failure to find undue 
hardship, that amounted to, at most, legal error not warranting a voided 
judgment.55 United, after receiving notice, had opportunity to object or 
timely appeal and should not have slept on its rights.56 
The Court’s holding went further. In discussions between 
creditors and debtors concerning student loans, the parties “may agree 
that payment of a student loan debt will cause the debtor an undue 
hardship sufficient to justify discharge,” thereby mutually consenting to 
undue hardship without initiating an adversary proceeding. 57  A 
bankruptcy court would still have to make a determination of undue 
hardship to satisfy § 523(a)(8),58 but debtors would no longer need to 
                                                        
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 270. 
52  Id. at 272 (“Espinosa's failure to serve United with a summons and complaint 
deprived United of a right granted by a procedural rule . . . [t]his deprivation did not 
amount to a violation of United's constitutional right to due process.”) (citation 
omitted). 
53 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
54 Espinosa, 559 U.S. 272. 
55 Id. at 274-75. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 278 (“Neither the Code nor the Rules prevent the parties from stipulating to 
the underlying facts of undue hardship, and neither prevents the creditor from waiving 
service of a summons and complaint.”). 
58 Id. (“[T]o comply with § 523(a)(8)’s directive, the bankruptcy court must make an 
independent determination of undue hardship before a plan is confirmed, even if the 
creditor fails to object or appear in the adversary proceeding."). 
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initiate litigation against their creditors provided the two can agree that 
paying an outstanding student loan would constitute undue hardship.59 
 
V. CONSEQUENCES 
With Espinosa’s holding, the Supreme Court has refined its 
interpretation of when due process is satisfied in relation to an 
adversarial proceeding regarding student loan creditors. Three other 
circuits previously held that a student loan creditor was denied due 
process when debtors failed to serve a complaint and summons to their 
creditors.60 Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski reasoned that 
the “constitutional standard, as we understand it, requires that a party 
affected by the litigation obtain sufficient notice,” 61  as opposed to the 
heightened, and stricter, standard promulgated by the FRBP requiring a 
summons and complaint that other circuits have claimed was due to a 
creditor.62 The Espinosa Court stated that due process merely required 
notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, echoing the 
Mullane standard, and that actual notice satisfied the constitutional 
requirement. 63  The rules requiring a summons and complaint 
enumerated within the FRBP, however, were procedural rules, not 
constitutional ones.64 
The Espinosa decision has made it easier for debtors who are 
interested in a chapter 13 plan but may be wary of initiating an 
adversarial proceeding. The requirements of the FRBP to discharge 
student loans are still applicable. In most cases, a debtor wanting to 
commence chapter 13 will still have to initiate an adversarial proceeding 
and request that a bankruptcy court hold a hearing to create a plan 
agreed upon by all interested parties. However, the Espinosa decision has 
bolstered the procedural legitimacy of discharge by declaration 
provisions by ensuring that a court upholding such a provision will not 
                                                        
59 Id.  
We thus assume that, in some cases, a debtor and creditor may agree 
that payment of a student loan debt will cause the debtor an undue 
hardship sufficient to justify discharge. In such a case, there is no 
reason that compliance with the undue hardship requirement should 
impose significant costs on the parties or materially delay 
confirmation of the plan. 
Id. 
60 See supra notes 5, 6 and accompanying text.  
61 Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1204 (emphasis added). 
62 See supra notes 5, 6 and accompanying text. These circuits required a complaint and 
notice served upon a creditor.  
63 Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 272. 
64 Id. See also FED. R. BANKR. P 7004 (2014). 
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automatically be a void judgment merely because a creditor was not 
served with a summons and complaint. 
At least one commentator has stated that the lack of clear 
approval or disapproval of a discharge by declaration provision, and the 
mere sanction of a court judgment’s finality of ruling concerning the 
declaration, may lead to some confusion among the circuits in future 
proceedings.65 At the very least, the Espinosa decision will not require a 
court to hold as void a provision within a debtor’s confirmation plan 
discharging student loans, or similar debt, after successful completion of 
the plan provided the creditor had sufficient notice under the Mullane 
standard. Nor, for that matter, would a court be required to hold as void 
under 60(b)(4) a lower court decision upholding a debtor’s chapter 13 
plan even where the creditor is not served with a summons or 
complaint. Furthermore, inconsistencies between the chapter 13 plan’s 
provisions and the Bankruptcy Code are not themselves sufficient to 
overturn a judgment confirming a plan. 
The Espinosa decision may allow for underhanded, bad-faith 
tactics by practitioners seeking to “slip in” a discharge by declaration 
provision, a fear United expressed in Espinosa.66 The Court, however, 
dismissed fears of rampant lawyer misconduct by citing the available 
recourse against dishonest advocates and how they “face penalties under 
various provisions for engaging in improper conduct in bankruptcy 
proceedings.” 67  Attorney wrongdoing is procedurally constrained by 
FRBP 1008, 68  which requires lawyers to verify any statement they 
make, 69  and sanctions for misrepresentations are enumerated under 
FRBP 9011.70 Courts may sanction lawyers who make improper claims, 
                                                        
65 Ralph Brubaker, Supreme Court Upholds “Discharge by Declaration” of Student Loan Debts in 
Chapter 13 (or Does It?), 30 N. 6 BANKR. LAW LETTER 1, 1 (“With respect to whether the 
practice itself is or is not appropriate, though, the Court sent mixed signals that will 
likely perpetuate extreme nonuniformity in the prevalence of and attitudes toward 
discharge-by-declaration.”).  
66 Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 278 (“United argues that our failure to declare the Bankruptcy 
Court's order void will encourage unscrupulous debtors to abuse the Chapter 13 
process by filing plans proposing to dispense with the undue hardship requirement in 
the hopes the bankruptcy court will overlook the proposal and the creditor will not 
object.”).  
67 Id. (quoting Taylor v. Freeland, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992)).  
68 FED. R. BANKR. P 1008 (1991). 
69 “All petitions, lists, schedules, statements and amendments thereto shall be verified 
or contain an unsworn declaration as provided in 28 U.S.C. §1746.” Id.  
70  FED. R. BANKR. P 9011 (1997). Attorneys are required to sign any “petition, 
pleading, written motion, and other paper, except a list, schedule, or statement, or 
amendments.” Id. After notice and reasonable opportunity to respond, the court may 
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frivolous or unwarranted claims or defenses, or factual claims without 
evidentiary on either the opposing counsel’s initiative or the court’s.71 
Additional reproof is available beyond in-court sanctions, such as 
professional reprimand by the bar for violating Rule 3.1 of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct.72 Lawyers who would rely on Espinosa’s 
holding as a way to surreptitiously advance an insincere chapter 13 plan 
on their client’s behalf, while confounding the due process of the 
creditor, are subject to very real and deterring admonishments from a 
variety of sources. 
Notwithstanding a lawyer’s malfeasance, the Espinosa decision 
provides a new method of discharging loans to debtors entertaining the 
idea of chapter 13 bankruptcy. Those debtors wary of an adversarial 
proceeding may negotiate with their creditor to establish a plan that 
could mitigate their student loan burden. Additionally, the Espinosa 
decision is an opportunity for debtors and creditors to voluntarily 
remove the uncertainty inherent in litigation, specifically that which 
arose from the circuit split concerning judicial determinations of undue 
hardship. Student loan creditors can now negotiate with debtors a 
favorable plan that can help creditors better recoup a portion of the 
outstanding debt while letting debtors and creditors avoid the additional 
expense of litigation. By upholding discharge agreements between 
parties in interest without recourse to an adversarial proceeding or 
undue hardship determination, debtors and creditors can agree among 
themselves on an appropriate plan concerning loans and whether 
discharge is practicable. 
VI. Conclusion 
Student loan debt is a rising problem that seriously affects 
spending decisions by debtors. Fewer graduates are able to purchase a 
house or participate in forming businesses when loan payments replace a 
part of their discretionary spending. Repayment options are available, 
but do little to help debtors whose loans may be wildly out of 
proportion to their income. The Bankruptcy Code provides for the 
discharge of student loans under chapter 13, but only if the debtor is 
willing to enter into an adversarial proceeding and all parties in interest 
                                                                                                                                  
impose sanctions on motions or sua sponte. Id. These sanctions, however, are “limited 
to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by 
others similarly situated” and may be monetary or otherwise. Id.  
71 Id. 
72  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.1. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT 1.3 cmt. 1 (“The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not 
require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in 
the legal process with courtesy and respect.”).  
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can agree on a proposed payment plan. With the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Espinosa, creditors and debtors can avoid the uncertainty of 
litigation and agree among themselves as to whether a certain student 
loan constitutes undue hardship. 
